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Abstract
This Article addresses the constitutional convergence theory by examining the 
standing rule in the Indonesian Constitutional Court. The central investigation 
of this paper is whether the application of standing doctrine in the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court is evidence of constitutional convergence or of borrowing? 
This paper argues that the Constitutional Court jurisprudence on standing 
indicates that constitutional convergence has never taken place but rather the 
Court has engaged in constitutional borrowing. Legal borrowing on standing is 
limited to the carbon copy of the ƤveǦprong standing tests of the U.S. model, 
but in reality standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is not 
based on the private rights model of adjudication. Although the Court allows 
individuals to bring cases before the Court, it is rather a uasiǦpublic model of 
standing, in which claimants no longer have standing only to vindicate their own 
private rights but can also sue to vindicate public interests. Standing requirements 
also allow the judges to review many highly sensitive political cases, and to 
some extent it enables the Court to second guess the decisions of the diơerent 
branches of government.
Key words: Constitutional Convergence, Constitutional Borrowing, Doctrine of 
Standing, Constitutional Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the constitutional convergence theory by examining 
the standing rule in the Indonesian Constitutional Court. In a nutshell, the 
theory of constitutional convergence claims that the content of constitutional 
law is becoming increasingly similar across the globe. But, having realized the 
complexities of constitutional convergence, a few caveats and clariƤcations 
are in order. First, this article focuses on rights based convergence instead of 
structural based convergence. David Law, with his theory of a global race to 
the top, focuses on constitutional convergence in terms of the protection of 
individual rights.1 Rights based convergence must be distinguished from structural 
constitutional convergence, which focuses on the structural form of government, 
such as separation of powers and democratic elections for the legislature and 
the head of executive. Mark Tushnet suggests convergence among national 
constitutional systems can take place in their protection of fundamental rights 
and their structures, such as the creation of an independent court.2 As important 
as the constitutional structure is, this paper will not focus on whether structural 
convergence occurs in Indonesia, but rather on rights based convergence. 
Second, much of the scholarship on  rights based convergence focuses on 
the adoption of rights in the written constitution. Elkins, Ginsburg and Simmons 
posit that there has been substantial convergence with regard to human rights in 
national constitutions across the globe.3 Their studies focus on the incorporation 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its complementary 
treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in various 
national constitutions.4 David Law and Mila Versteeg collected data on rights 
provision from 1ͤͤ diơerent constitutions that were adopted from 194͢ to 200͢, 
and they conclude that national constitutions, on average, grow similar over 
time with the inclusion of a relatively high number of rights in the Ƥrst place.5 
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the content of the Indonesian 
1 David Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 Nw. U.L. Rev, 2008, p. 1277.
2  Mark Tushent, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 Va. J. Int’l L., 2009, 985.
3  Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Beth Simmons, 
 ǣƤǡǡ
, 54 Harv. Int’l L.J., 2013, p. 61.
4  Id. 
5  David Law,  
, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 2011, p. 1163.
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Constitution and see whether it is characterized by imitation or convergence of 
rights. The object of investigation of this article is on judicial opinions instead 
of written constitutions.  Thus, in order to analyze rights based convergence 
in Indonesia, I will consult the Constitutional Court cases of the last decade. 
Third, some scholars posit the judges as driving forces behind constitutional 
convergence. Anne Marie Slaughter postulates the concept of a “global community 
of judges,” arguing that high court judges frequently talk across jurisdiction.͢ 
The global community of judges then tries to inƪuence domestic courts to take 
particular approaches.7 Mark Tushnet also argues for judgeǦledǦconvergence, 
noting the spread of proportionality review, judicial balancing and the language 
of margins of appreciation as examples of judgeǦledǦconvergence towards adopting 
common constitutional formula.8 On some level, this article is about judgeǦledǦ
convergence; nonetheless, it will not focus on the participation of Indonesian 
judges in a global community of judges. This article will not examine to what 
extent Indonesian Constitutional Court Justices are inƪuenced by their fellow 
international judges, but rather, how the judges are inƪuenced by ideas from 
diơerent jurisdictions. 
Fourth, in his critical analysis to Law’s “race to the top” theory, Mark 
Tushnet argues that it is diƥcult to deƤne what the “top” of constitutional 
rights protection might be.9 Tushnet believes that there is no general reason to 
think that U.S. constitutional law is at the “top” with respect to every speciƤc 
constitutional guarantee.10 Shall this paper compare the Indonesian Constitution 
and the U.S. Constitution? This paper does not aim to compare the Indonesian 
Constitution with the U.S. constitution. David Law and Mila Verstegg, in their 
study of the inƪuence of the U.S. Constitution abroad, placed the Indonesian 
Constitution in the top Ƥve constitutions least similar to the U.S. Constitution.11 
Nonetheless, some constitutional practices in the United States will be taken 
6  Anne Marie Slaughter, 
, 44 Harv. Int’l L. J., 2003, p. 191.
7  For a recent scholarship on the court on court encounters as the basis of convergence, please see Paul B. Stephan, Courts on 
ǣ	 ơ  , 100 Va. L. Rev, 2014, p. 17.
8  Mark Tushnet,The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 Va. J. Int’l L., 2009, p. 985.
9 Tushnet, id, at 1003.
10  Id. 
11  David Law and Mila Versteeg,  ƪ , 87 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 762, 781.
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into consideration, especially on the rule of standing. 
 The central investigation of this paper is whether the application 
of standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is evidence of 
constitutional convergence or evidence of constitutional borrowing. Rosalind 
Dixon and Eric Posner argue that many scholars make very general claims about 
constitutional convergence and thus neglect the complexities of the convergence 
theory.12 Dixon and Posner alleged that there are various pathways of convergence 
and that sometimes the actual convergence is limited or even does not take place 
at all.13 For example, the adoption of a bill of rights might only be constitutional 
borrowing instead of constitutional convergence. Constitutional borrowing does 
not always result in convergence and sometimes divergence occurs instead.
This paper argues that the Constitutional Court jurisprudence on standing 
indicates that constitutional convergence has never taken place but rather the 
Court has engaged in constitutional borrowing. Legal borrowing on standing is 
limited to the carbon copy of the ƤveǦprong standing test of the U.S. model, but 
in reality standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is not based 
on a private rights model of adjudication. Although the Court allows individuals 
to bring cases before the Court, it is rather a quasiǦpublic model of standing, 
in which claimants no longer have standing only to vindicate their own private 
rights but also to vindicate public interests.
II. DISCUSSION
The Strange Birth of Standing
 Standing is an important issue to review because it helps us to understand 
the nature of constitutional litigation in Indonesia. Steven Winter says that the 
question of standing is a  question of the nature of our relationship in society 
and our ability to sustain community.14 For Winter, standing divides members of 
the community from one another by reinforcing our individual and conƪicting 
12  Rosalind Dixon and Eric Posner, The Limits of Constitutional Convergence, 11 Chi. J. Int’l L, 2011, p. 399.
13  Id. at p. 405.
14  Steven Winter, 
, 40 Stan. L. Rev, 1393, p. 1371.
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selfǦinterests and by submerging our common stake in the fate of the community. 
Former Chief Justice Aharon Barak of the Israel Supreme Court shares the view 
that the way a judge applies the rules of standing is determined by his approach 
to his judicial role.15
In the last ten years, especially under the leadership of the Ƥrst Chief Justice 
Jimly Asshiddiqie, the Court has crafted a peculiar doctrine of standing that 
expanded the access of people to bring cases before the Court. On the surface, 
the Indonesian Constitutional Court has employed a similar doctrine of standing 
to the United States, which requires a threeǦprong standing test.1͢ The Court 
requires the petitioner to demonstrate injury in order to establish standing. 
The Court deƤned this injuryǦbased standing in the Biem Benjamin case.17 The 
petitioner was a politician who intended to run for Governor of the Special 
Capital Territory of Jakarta. He wanted to run as an independent candidate, but 
the Law only permitted candidates that were nominated by a political party.18 
He asked the Court to declare the law unconstitutional, thus allowing him to 
run for Governor as an independent candidate.    
The Court ruled that in order to establish constitutional injury (kerugian 
konstitusional), the claimant must fulƤll Ƥve requirements: 1) the claimant has 
a constitutional right that is guaranteed by the Constitution; 2) the claimant 
considers that his or her constitutional rights have been violated by the challenged 
statute; 3) the constitutional injury should be speciƤc and actual or at least 
potential in character, that is, according to normal logic, the injury is likely to 
occur; 4) there should be a causal relationship (causal verband) between the 
15 According to Justice Ahron Barak, a judge who regards his role as deciding a dispute between persons with rights will tend to 
emphasize the need for strict standing. By contrast, a judge who regards his judicial role as bridging the gap between law and 
society and protecting (formal and substantive) democracy will tend to expand the rules of standing, because liberal rules of standing 
enable courts to hear matters that ordinarily would not Ƥnd their way before a court. If the Court restricts its standing rule, then 
many potentially impactful cases would not be reviewed. See Aharon Barak, “A Judge on Judging:  
,” 116 Harv. L. Rev. 16 (November, 2002), 107 – 108; See also AharonBarak, The Judge In A Democracy, Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 190.
16 The U.S. law of standing has its roots in Article III’s case and controversy requirement The U.S. Supreme Court has established 
a threeǦpart test for standing. The constitutional minimum of standing” requires the plaintiơ to establish: Ƥrst, an injury in fact. 
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the complained, in which the injury has to be traceable to 
the challenged action of the defendant.  Third, the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.
See Erwin Chemerinksy, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (2006).
17  The Constitutional Court decision no. 006/PUU-III/2005, reviewing the Law No. 32 of 2004 on the Regional Government [-
Ȃ) (hereinafter the   case).
18  Law Number 32 of 2004 on the Regional Governance, article 59 (2). 
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enactment of the challenged statute and the injury; and 5) there should be 
the possibility that with the issuance of a favorable decision, the constitutional 
injury would not occur or would not be repeated.19
Although these requirements are relatively similar to the ƤveǦprong standing 
test in the U.S. Constitutional system, the Indonesian Constitutional Court, has 
provided a completely diơerent interpretation on standing requirements.  In the 
Biem Benjamin case, the Court held, “although the claimant could not show 
injury in fact (because he never ran for the position of Governor), it can be 
predicted that the claimant’s candidacy would be turned down by the General 
Election Commission, and therefore the claimant has fulƤlled the standing 
requirement.” In other words, the Court held that potential injury is suƥcient 
to establish standing before the Court.  
Although the Biem Benjamin case signiƤes that the standing requirements 
arise from individual claims of private rights, it opens the way for constitutional 
claims invoked by third parties or large groups of people. In the U.S. constitutional 
realm, this type of standing is known as generalized grievance.20 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has adopted a principle preventing individuals from suing if their only 
injury is as taxpayer21 or citizen22 concerned with having the government follow 
the Constitution. Unlike the U.S Supreme Court, the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court allows individuals to have standing as taxpayer or citizen.  
Most of the Indonesian Constitutional Court decisions related to social 
economic issues were framed within the context of generalized grievance standing. 
The Ƥrst Court decision that established generalized grievance standing was 
the Electricity Law case, which dealt with the privatization of the electricity 
industry.23 The claimants were human rights NGOs who argued that as nonǦ
proƤt organizations, they had standing to represent the public.24 The Court 
19  The Constitutional Court decision no. 006/PUU-III/2005, reviewing the Law No. 32 of 2004 on the Regional Government [Pemer-
intahan Daerah – Pemda) (hereinafter the Pemda Law III case), at 16.
20  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
21  See 	Ǥ, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Ǥ, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Ǥ-
, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); 	Ǥ, 454 
U.S. 464 (1982).
22 Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
23  The Constitutional Court decision no. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003, reviewing Law No. 20 of 2000 on the Electricity (hereinafter the 
 case).
24  Id, at 13 -14.
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held, “considering the claimants are electricity consumers, and taxpayers, they 
have the right to question any statute on economic policy that involved public 
welfare.”25 Thus, the Court allowed individuals and organizations to Ƥle petitions 
for judicial review as consumers and taxpayers. 
Later, in the Oil & Gas Law I case,2͢ the Court reinforced the generalized 
grievance standing approach. The claimants were four human rights NGOs who 
argued that as nonǦproƤt organizations they had standing to represent the public 
in challenging the privatization of the state owned oil company, PERTAMINA.27 
The Court held, “the objective of those NGOs is to Ƥght for public interest 
advocacy…therefore the Court is of the opinion that the petitioners have standing 
to raise constitutional issues.”28 In other words, the Court permitted public interest 
NGOs to come before the Court as defenders of the people at large.  
In the Water Resources Law case,29 the Court moved even further, issuing 
a ruling that every citizen has standing to challenge the Water Resources Law. 
The claimants were two prominent NGOs in Indonesia, the Indonesian Legal 
Aid Institute and Friends of the Earth Indonesia (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup 
Indonesia – WALHI) and some individuals. They challenged the Water Resources 
Law that grants control over Indonesia’s water resources to private entities.30 The 
Court held that every citizen may act on his or her own as a defender of the 
people, and the Court does not require that the claimants assert an injury that 
is shared by a large number of people.31
This article posits that the generalized grievance standing is basically the 
Court’s doctrinal invention. The period from 2003 to 2008 was characterized by 
the rise of generalized grievance standing in the Constitutional Court. 32 The 
invention was actually a strategy that was employed by the then Chief Justice, 
25  Id. at 327.
26  The Constitutional Court decision no. 002/PUU-I/2003, reviewing Law No. 22 of 2001 on the Oil and Gas (hereinafter the Oil and 
Gas Law I case).
27  Id., at 10. 
28  Id. at 200.
29  The  case, the Constitutional Court decision no. 058-059-060-063/PUU-II/2004. 
30  Law Number 7 of 2004 on Water Resources.
31  The  case, supra note 29, at 78.
32  My data reveal there were at least Ƥfteen cases that were initiated by NGOs during the period 2003 – 2008.  
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Jimmly Asshiddiqie to enhance the Court’s authority.33 On the one hand, Chief 
Justice Asshiddiqie knew that the Court would not be able to review governmental 
policies if nobody challenged the governmental policies before the Court. On the 
other hand, there were many NGOs whose agenda was to challenge governmental 
policies. Asshiddiqie saw the potential for collaboration between the Court and 
NGOs because both shared a similar vision for political and economic reform.34 
Therefore, he led the Court to apply generalized grievance standing, which 
permits NGOs to challenge governmental policies with minimal barriers in 
terms of standing.
Although generalized grievance standing has become one of the benchmarks 
of the Constitutional Court doctrine, it does not mean that the Court is always 
unanimous on the subject. An apt example is the Court’s decision with regards 
to taxpayer standing; two justices Ƥled dissenting opinions and argued against 
the application of generalized grievance standing.35 Chief Justice Asshiddiqie 
himself was fully aware that he did not have absolute control over the Court’s 
decision, and, thus, he tried to build consensus among his colleagues that the 
Court needed to apply a more lenient standing test in the early years of the 
Court’s operation. One of the associate justices conƤrmed that the Chief Justice 
managed to convince his brethren to apply a lenient standing test lest no one 
come before the Court.3͢
The departure of Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie from the Court in 2008, 
however, did not lead to the abandonment of standing doctrine. Under the 
leadership of his successor Chief Justice Mohammad Mahfud, the Court 
continued to employ generalized grievance standing. For instance, the Mahfud 
Court allowed an NGO to challenge the authority of the Ministry of Forestry 
to grant large concessions to private mining companies for mining exploration 
33  See Hendrianto, From Humble Beginnings to a Functioning Court: The Indonesian Constitutional Court, 2003 – 2008 (Unpublished 
PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, 2008) (on Ƥle with author).
34  Private conversation with JimlyAsshiddiqie, Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, in Jakarta, Indonesia (July 31, 
2006).
35  The Constitutional Court decision no. 003/PUU-I/2003, reviewing Law No. 24 of 2002 on the Government Securities Law (hereinafter 
the 
 case).
36  Private conversation with MaruararSiahaan, Associate Justice of the Constitutional Court, in Jakarta, Indonesia (July 4, 2006).
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in “State Forest Areas”.37 The case was signiƤcant because Indonesia’s central 
government has control over the country’s vast forest area and thus the Ministry 
of Forestry had the right to grant large concessions to private companies for 
logging, plantations, and mining exploration even if the area has been managed 
for generations by indigenous people. The case was initiated by an NGO, The 
Alliance of Indigenous People’s Organization (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara 
Ǧ AMAN), which claimed to represent 2,240 indigenous communities and a total 
of 15 million people across the archipelago.38 The Court ruled that the petitioner 
had standing to challenge the Forestry Law because the petitioner is an NGO 
who has concern over indigenous issues.39
Another apt example of the doctrine of generalized grievance standing under 
the Mahfud Court is the Court decision in the Deputy Minister case.40 The State 
Ministry Law allows the President to appoint a deputy minister to assist with the 
minister’s responsibilities. In his second administration, President Yudhoyono 
appointed 20 Deputy Ministers. An NGO called the National Movement to 
Eradicate Corruption (GNPK) challenged the appointment of those deputy 
minister and argued that the position was unnecessary and a waste of state 
funds.41The Court ruled that the GNPK had standing because its members were 
taxpayers whose interest had been harmed by the government’s decision to 
appoint deputy ministers.  
Standing and Abstract Review
While it is easy to conclude that the Indonesian Constitutional Court has 
invented its own standing doctrine, I would like also to consider a structural 
design that facilitated the rise of generalized grievance standing. By design, the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court only has authority to pronounce consistency of 
statute. In other words, the Court only has authority to review a constitutional 
37  The Constitutional Court decision no. 35/PUU-X/2012, reviewing Law No. 41 of 1999  (hereinafter the  
case).
38  See Mina Susana Setra, ǣǲǳ, presentation at International Confer-
ence on Scaling-Up Strategies to Secure Community Land and Resource, Interlaken, Switzerland, September 19-20, 2013. 
39  See   case, supra note 37 at 161.
40  The Constitutional Court decision no. 79/PUU-IX/2011, reviewing Law No. 39 of 2008 on the Cabinet Minister (hereinafter the 
Deputy Minister case).
41 Id. at 80.
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question in an abstract manner and not to solve a concrete constitutional 
case. Abstract review is basically compatible with inquiry standing instead of 
injury standing.42 The Court’s decision in an abstract review does not aim to 
resolve the injury suơered by the claimant but rather, to simply pronounce the 
constitutionality of the challenged statute. Consequently, the Court will only 
provide some type of advisory remedy.  
A telling example of such advisory remedy is the Court’s decision in the 
Electricity Law case, in which the Court invalidated the entire statute because 
it was proven to be inconsistent with economic clauses in the Constitution.43 
The Court held that all agreements or contracts and business permits in the 
electricity industry that had been signed and issued based on the nulliƤed Law 
should remain valid until the expiration date of the contracts or agreements and 
business permits in question.44  Obviously, the Court’s decision only pronounces 
the consistency of the statute with the Constitution, and it has no eơect to 
create any remedy. In the very recent decision of the Constitutional Court on 
General Election schedule, the Court ruled that the current election mechanism 
contradicted the Constitution.45 It held that the presidential election and 
legislation election should be held concurrently; however, the Court’s decision 
will not apply until the 2019 General Election instead of the recent General 
Election in 2014.4͢
Basically, the Court’s decision is merely a declaratory judgment, in which the 
Court has authority to issue interpretation on the constitutionality of law but, it 
is simply an advisory opinion. Therefore, the type of remedy that the Court can 
render is merely declaratory relief.  The eơect of the Court’s decision rests on 
its moral authority and the willingness of the other political branches to follow 
that decision. The Oil and Gas Law I case is an obvious example of this kind of 
declaratory relief. In this case, the Court held that fuel prices should be regulated 
42  See Richard S. Kay, “Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues: A Comparative Analysis,” in  Richard S. Kay (ed.), 
 ǣ (2005). 
43  See the  case, supra note 23.
44  Id at 350. 
45  The Constitutional Court decision no 14/PUU-XI/2013 reviewing Law No. 42 of 2008 on the Presidential Election (hereinafter the 
 case).
46  Id. at 88. See also The Jakarta Post, “Court rules one voting day in 2019,” January 24, 2014. 
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by the Government, and consequently, it invalidated the provision that ruled 
that fuel prices should be regulated by the market mechanism.47 Not long after 
the Court issued its decision, the Government issued a Presidential Regulation 
which set up fuel prices based on the market mechanism.48 In response to the 
Presidential Decree, the Court wrote a letter and reminded the President that 
the market price clause in the Oil and Gas Law had been invalidated and the 
Government should not consider it a source of law any longer.49 The President, 
in his formal reply to the Constitutional Court, stated that that the government’s 
decision corresponded with the Court’s holding50 and that The Government was in 
fact regulating the fuel price as mandated by the Court through the Presidential 
Regulation.51 Then, the President reminded the Court not to trespass beyond its 
jurisdiction and authority.
There are several instances where the Executive decided to comply with the 
Court’s decision. One telling example is the Attorney General case.52 The central 
dispute in this case was whether an Attorney General is a cabinet oƥcial, and, 
whether he serves in accordance with the length of term of a cabinet.  The Court 
majority ruled that the Attorney General should be subjected to term limits as 
a Cabinet Minister.53 Following the Court’s decision, Chief Justice Muhammad 
Mahfud urged the President to dismiss the Attorney General Hendarman Supandji, 
who had previously not been subjected to the term limit.54 President Yudhoyono 
decided to uphold the Court ruling by removing Hendarman Supandji from his 
post. Despite the President’s compliance, the Court basically has no command 
over its decision and depends entirely on the willingness of the Executive to 
comply with the Court decision.
47  See The Constitutional Court decision no. 002/PUU-I/2003, reviewing Law No. 22 of 2001 on the Oil and Gas (hereinafter the Oil 
and Gas Law I case).
48  The Presidential Regulation No. 55 of 2005. 
49  Letter from Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court to the President of Republic of Indonesia, October 6, 2005 (copy 
on Ƥle with the author). 
50  The President of Republic of Indonesia to the Chief Justice of Constitutional Court, October 14, 2005 (copy on Ƥle with the author). 
51  Id.  
52  The Constitutional Court decision no. 49/PUU-VIII/2010, reviewing Law No. 16/2004 on the Attorney General Oƥce (hereinafter 
the Attorney General case).
53  Id. at 133.
54  ǡ The Jakarta Post (Jakarta), September 22, 2010.
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Standing and Private Rights
Before I move to evaluate whether the Court’s standing doctrine is evidence 
of constitutional convergence or just of constitutional borrowing, it is necessary 
to explain the standing doctrine within the context of liberal constitution. In 
this article, I will use the standing doctrine in the U.S. constitutional system 
as the point of comparison. Although, the Indonesian Constitution has little 
resemblance to the U.S. Constitution, the ƤveǦprong standing test in the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court is reminiscent of the ƤveǦprong test in the 
U.S. constitutional system. For that reason, it is important to brieƪy review the 
standing doctrine as it is found in the U.S. constitutional system.   
Arthur Ripstein has provided a subtle analysis of the Kantian understanding 
of private rights and standing.55 In Kant’s understanding of rights, one might 
have a right also to enforce his or her rights. The right to enforce is remedial 
because it addresses private wrongs. Ripstein gives an illustration whereby if I 
carelessly bump you and injure your body or damage your property, and then 
I have interfered with your right to be the one who determines how your body 
and property will be used. A remedy then is supposed to give you back what you 
were entitled. The right of enforcement is your right to make me restore you to 
the position you would have held had I never wronged you. Nevertheless, you 
have no standing as a matter of private right to complaint if a hailstone injures 
you or damages your property, because there is nobody against whom you can 
direct your complaint. 
Kant’s insight on private rights can form a basis to understand the origin of 
standing doctrine in the U.S. constitutional realm. The modern U.S. standing 
doctrine invokes two important arguments about the judicial role. First, standing 
requirements ensure that adjudication addresses concrete issues brought by people 
who have interest.5͢ This argument has roots in the common law notion of private 
rights, and it contends that litigants should have a stake in a genuine dispute 
55 Arthur Ripstein, ǣ, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1391 (2006), 1416.
56  See John F. Muller,  , 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1373 (May 2013) Muller uses the notion of 
justiciability in his analysis on the relationship on the judicial role. Nevertheless, standing is part of the justiciability doctrine, so 
I will simply use standing in my reference to Muller’s argument.  
Convergence or Borrowing: Standing in The Indonesian Constitutional Court
Constitutional Review, May 2015, Volume 1, Number 140
capable of judicial redress.  Second, standing requirements ensure that the courts 
do not overstep their boundaries against the other branches of government.57
The modern U.S. principles of standing grew out of the distinction between 
public and private rights. In its original form, standing enforced the rule that the 
judiciary had the power only to vindicate private rights in suits by private litigants. 
Law was the body of rules that deƤned the rights of citizens and provided a 
remedy to the injured party. Based upon these principles, Chief Justice Marshall 
in Marbury v. Madison drew the conclusion that, “the very essence of civil liberty 
certainly consists in the light of every individual to claim the protection of the 
laws, whenever he receives an injury.”58Under the 18th century common law, rights 
were synonymous with remedies, remedies were synonymous with the forms of 
action and the forms of action were synonymous with the concept of redressable 
injuries.59 One might infer from this line of reasoning that in its original form, 
standing was based on the private rights model of litigation. 
Standing ƪourished as an independent doctrine in the early of the 20th 
century. Standing was developed principally at the hands of Justice Brandeis 
and later Justice Frankfurter to achieve the goal of protecting legislation from 
judicial attack.͢0Justice Frankfurter began to develop a new doctrine, that the 
violation of public right is insuƥcient to establish standing. If no private right 
was involved then the litigant’s only recourse was through the elected branches 
of government. In other words, standing required the invasion of a “legal right”. 
During the midǦtwentieth century, however, the Court expanded standing by 
abandoning the private rights requirement. One option for the Court to expand 
standing was to adopt a public rights model, permitting a private individual to 
bring suits against any violation of the public interest. Thus, the Court created 
a quasiǦpublic model of standing, in which litigants no longer had standing only 
to vindicate their own private rights but also to vindicate public interests. The 
only requirement for standing was that the challenged actions aơect the litigant. 
57 See Antonin Scalia,  ǣ   ǣ (1997).
58  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Crach) 87, 102 (1803).
59  Steven L. Winter, Ǧ, Stanford Law Review (1988): 1371-1516.
60  Maxwell L. Stearns, ǣ (2000), 218.
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But the litigants were not required to demonstrate the violation of private rights 
in order to prevail on the merits. 
 In the last forty years—starting with the Burger Court—the Court has 
again restricted standing. The belief that liberal access to the courts by private 
litigants seeking to enforce public rights endangers the separation of powers 
has driven the Court again to revert to what is essentially a private rights 
model for standing. But in returning to the private rights model, the Court did 
not abandon the injury in fact test; instead the Court stated that injury must 
be “actual”, “distinct,” “palpable,” and “concrete.” Abstract injuries such as the 
injury caused by the government’s failure to obey the law were insuƥcient. In 
general, the Court has denied standing to taxpayers and held that generalized 
grievance regarding government misconduct could not support standing, stating 
that standing required the plaintiơ to allege that he was in danger of suơering 
any particular concrete injury as a result of the government misconduct.͢1
Evaluating Standing
Having explained the development of standing doctrine in the United 
States, this paper will move to evaluate the evolution of standing doctrine in 
the Indonesian Constitutional Court. First and foremost, this paper argues that 
the standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is the product 
of constitutional borrowing rather than constitutional convergence; i.e., when 
the Court crafted the Ƥve prong standing test in the Biem Benjamin case, some 
Justices consciously copied what they saw in the United States. 
One plausible driving force behind the borrowing of the U.S. standing doctrine 
is former associate Justice Achmad Natabaya, who is the proponent of strict 
standing doctrine. While he was in the Court, Justice Achmad Natabaya preferred 
the Court to have a limited role and limited access for citizens. Justice Natabaya 
believed that the Constitutional Court had a limited role in reviewing statutes. 
Based on his view of the limited role of the Court, Natabaya believed that the 
Court should apply a strict standing rule because only through strict would the 
61 In the Ǥ, however, the Court held as a state, Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA over potential dam-
age caused to its territory by global warming.
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Court avoid trespassing on the jurisdictions of the other governmental branches. 
Natabaya believed that standing rules should require the claimant to assert a 
personalized and factual injury.͢2 According to Natabaya, there was a fundamental 
ƪaw within the standing mechanism in the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
because it allowed individual citizens to challenge a statute.͢3 Natabaya believed 
that the ideal standing mechanism was like that of the France Constitutional 
Council, in which only a designated institution—President, Prime Minister, Upper 
House, Lower House and Parliamentary minority —can challenge consistency 
of the statute with the Constitution.͢4
Nevertheless, Natabaya argued that if the Law allowed individual citizens to 
challenge a statute, then claimants must fulƤl certain requirements in order to 
establish standing. Natabaya said that the U.S. ƤveǦprong standing test became 
a reference for him in believing that there should be personalized and factual 
injury.͢5 As a scholar who studied in a U.S. Law School (Natabaya earned his 
LL.M degree from Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington) Natabaya was 
familiar with the U.S. style of standing and decided to copy the U.S. principle 
of injury standing. Moreover, Natabaya himself claimed that he was the only 
Justice who was educated in the American law school and with real knowledge 
of the US constitutional system.͢͢
Dixon and Posner warn that constitutional borrowing will often go in only 
one direction, that is from more successful or older countries to less successful 
or newer countries, or else from countries with a great deal of experience with 
an issue to countries that must address that issue for the Ƥrst time.͢7 In the 
case of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, the constitutional borrowing on 
standing, indeed, has gone into a diơerent direction. Clearly the standing doctrine 
in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is not based on a private rights model 
of adjudication. Although the Court allows individuals to bring cases before 
62  Private conversation with Achmad Natabaya, May 28, 2008.
63  Id. 
64  Id.  
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  Dixon and Posner, supra note12.
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the Court, it is rather a quasiǦpublic model of standing, in which claimants 
no longer have standing only to vindicate their own private rights but also to 
vindicate public interests.
One of the obvious examples of the quasiǦpublic rights model is the recent 
Court decision in the General Election schedule case. The claimant, Eơendi 
Ghazali, was a political activist who challenged the Presidential Election Law no. 
42 of 2008, which prescribed two separate election schedules for legislative and 
presidential elections. First, Ghazali argued that the current election mechanism 
has subverted the presidential system.  His concern was that a coalition of 
political parties that nominates a president will have too much leverage over 
the president elect. In other words, Ghazali argued that a president elect could 
be held hostage by the interest of a coalition of political parties that support 
his nomination.
Obviously, Ghazali invoked the public interest argument in his petition. 
Nonetheless, he also argued that the Law had infringed upon his voting rights. 
Ghazali referred to his personal experience in the 2004 General Election. At that 
time, he was doing his doctoral research in the city of Nijmegen, Netherlands. 
Ghazali returned to Indonesia to cast his vote for the legislative election on April 
5, 2004. Ghazali, however, could not cast his vote for the Presidential Election 
on July 5, 2004 because he had to travel back to Netherlands before that date. 
Ghazali posited that his voting rights had been deprived by the Law that set 
two separate election schedules.͢8
 Apart from the application of quasiǦpublic right model, the Court 
has consistently applied generalized grievance standing, which arises out of 
a public rights model of adjudication. The Court’s application of the public 
rights model obviously deviates from the private rights model in the U.S. 
Constitutional doctrine. There have been many examples of the public rights 
model of adjudications in the last ten years, but I would like to cite one more 
68 If one reviews the case closely, there is a mismatch between the challenged statute and the injury claimed. On the one hand, 
Ghazali invoked an injury that was caused by the 2004 presidential election process, which was based on Law no. 23 of 2003 
on the Presidential Election. On the other hand, he challenged the Law no. 42 of 2008 on the Presidential Election, which was 
enacted by the House in 2008. Thus, the challenged statute did not cause any immediate harm to Ghazali’s voting rights. 
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case as evidence of the prevailing of the public rights model of litigation in the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court. In 2012, the Court issued a decision in the BP 
Migas case.͢9 The petitioners challenged some of the key statutory provisions 
which mandated the Government to establish a Regulatory Agency to supervise 
the oil and gas upstream sector.70 The petition was initiated by twelve Islamic 
based organizations and 30 individuals, chieƪy led by Muhammadiyah, one of the 
largest Islamic nonǦgovernmental organizations in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah as 
the chief petitioner asserted that it came before the Court as an organization with 
the objective of establishing an Islamic civil society, and, thus, it had standing 
to represent public interest.71
The Court majority did not provide any speciƤc ruling on standing; it simply 
held that the plaintiơs had standing to bring the case. Nevertheless, there was a 
dissenting opinion, in which Justice Harjono argued that the plaintiơs have no 
standing to bring the case.72 Justice HarJono did not write a lengthy dissent; he 
simply criticized the Court majority for their lack of consideration with regard 
to the issue of standing. He believed that the Court did not provide suƥcient 
legal reasoning in reaching the conclusion that the plaintiơs had standing to 
Ƥle the case before the Court.73
The BP Migas case is not only an exemplar of the public rights model of 
litigation but also evidence that the public rights model of litigation in Indonesia 
is not remedial because it does not aim to address private wrongs and any remedy 
provided by the Court will not give you back that to which you were entitled. 
In the BP Migas case, the Court held that the establishment of the Regulatory 
Agency of Oil and Gas Upstream Sector had reduced state control over petroleum 
resources. After the Court announced its decision, The Minister of Energy then 
established a Special Task Force for Upstream Oil and Gas Activities, which 
had the responsibility to take over all duties, functions, and employees of the 
69  The Constitutional Court decision no. 36/PUU-X/2012, reviewing Law No. 22 of 2001 on the Oil and Gas (hereinafter the Oil and 

   / BP Migas case). The Court Ƥnished the deliberation meeting on November 5th 2012 and it announced the decision 
on November 13, 2012
70  Article 1 section 23 & article 4 section 3.
71  Indonesian Constitution, article 28C (2).
72  See the BP Migas case, supra note 69, at 118.
73  Id.
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Regulatory Agency of Oil and Gas Upstream Sector, actually carrying out similar 
tasks to the disbanded Regulatory Agency.74
A few days after the Court issued the decision, Muhammadiyah celebrated its 
100th anniversary. The Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Din Syamsuddin expressed 
his gratitude and praised the Court’s decision as the Ƥnest anniversary gift for 
Muhammadiyah.75 Nonetheless, he raised a concern that “there is no diơerence 
before and after the decision issued by the Court. It only changes name and 
address.” 7͢ Mr. Syamsuddin clearly did not have deep knowledge of the workings of 
the Court, otherwise, he would not have been surprised to Ƥnd that the Executive 
might simply ignore the Court’s decision. Obviously, the Court has no judicial 
command to enforce its decision. Simon Butt, a professor at the University of 
Sydney in his analysis of the Court decision on the Electricity Law case,77 has 
criticized the Court for its lack of judicial command. Butt explained that around 
two months after the Court invalidated the Electricity Law, the Government 
issued a regulation which appears to have countered the Court’s decision.78 This 
regulation was described as being very similar to the Law that was invalidated by 
the Court in the Ƥrst place. Butt lamented the fact that the Court can do nothing 
to remedy the unconstitutionality of the new regulation.79The BP Migas case is 
basically another chapter in the history of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, 
in which it is made clear that their decision is merely a declaration judgment 
and the Court can do nothing to enforce its decision. 
 Private claimants who bring cases under the quasiǦpublic right models 
are also not immune to the problem of the lack of remedy to give back that to 
which  they were entitled. A telling example is the Mohammad Sholeh case.80 
Mohammad Sholeh was a legislative candidate from the Indonesian Democratic 
74  See the Regulation of Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources no. 9 of 2013.
75 ͙͘͘, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta), November 19, 2012.
76    Ǯ ǯ (The Presidential Decree in lieu of the Regulatory Agency is Same Old Same Old), 
Republika (Jakarta), November 15, 2012.
77  The  case, supra note 23.
78  See Simon Butt & Tim Lindsey, ǣ ǯ͛͛
the Constitution (The University of Sydney, Sydney Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09/29), May 2009.
79  Id. at 21.
80  The Constitutional Court Decision No. 22-24/PUU-VI/2008, reviewing the Law No. 10 of 2008 on the Election of National and 
Regional Parliament (hereinafter  case).
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Party of Struggle (PDIǦP). He challenged the constitutionality of the Legislative 
Election Law, which ruled that the candidate with the highestǦranking position 
in the candidate list shall be elected as legislator.81 Sholeh was ranked seventh in 
the candidate list, and he was unlikely to win the legislative seat based on that 
ranking. He asked the Court to nullify these statutory rules. The Court accepted 
his argument and declared the rules unconstitutional. But Sholeh’s petition never 
aimed to address any private wrong against him because his petition was based 
on speculative injury. He Ƥled the petition long before the legislative election 
and he never won any legislative seats.82
 
III. CONCLUSION
The Indonesian Constitutional Court has engaged in constitutional borrowing 
with regards to the doctrine of standing. But clearly constitutional convergence 
has not occurred. Indeed, divergence has in fact occurred. The Indonesian 
standing doctrine never arises out of the vindication of private rights. Standing 
requirements never intend to set the bar for the Court to address concrete issues, 
but rather they are an instrument for the Court to gain access to review many 
abstract cases. Standing requirements also allow the judges to review many highly 
sensitive political cases, and, to some extent, they enable the Court to second 
guess the decisions of the diơerent branches of government.  Moreover, the 
standing doctrine in Indonesia signiƤes that the Court’s treatment of standing 
has the potential to be governed by the political preference or the pragmatic 
choices of its members rather than by the doctrinal authority.
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